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Abstract
A polar coding scheme is introduced in this paper for the wire-tap channel. It is shown that the provided scheme
achieves the entire rate-equivocation region for the case of symmetric and degraded wire-tap channel, where the
weak notion of secrecy is assumed. For the particular case of binary erasure wire-tap channel, an alternative proof
is given. The case of general non-degraded wire-tap channels is also considered.
I. INTRODUCTION
Channel coding via the method of channel polarization is provided by Arikan in [2]. On a binary-input discrete
memoryless channel (DMC), polarization ends up with either ‘good bits’, i.e., binary channels whose capacity
approaches 1 bit per channel use, or ‘wasted bits’, i.e., channels whose capacity approaches zero. The fraction of
the good bits is equal to the mutual information with equiprobable inputs (which equals the capacity for the case of
symmetric channels). In a physically degraded setting, as mentioned in [2], an order of polarization is maintained
in the sense that ‘good’ bits for the degraded channel, must also be ‘good’ for the better channel.
For a standard single-user channel coding problem, the polar coding scheme is based on transmitting the uncoded
information bits over the capacity approaching channels (when we interpret the polarization as a kind of a precoding
or pre-processing). At the same time, fixed and predetermined bits are transmitted over the channels whose capacity
approaches zero. These predetermined bits are still needed in the successive decoding process, hence they can not
be ignored.
A secrecy polar scheme is suggested in this paper for the wire-tap channel. A secret message needs to be
transmitted reliably to a legitimate user. At the same time, this message must be kept secret from the eavesdropper.
At the first part of this paper, it is assumed that the marginal channel to the eavesdropper is physically degraded
with respect to the marginal channel to the legitimate user. The proposed secrecy polar scheme for the degraded
case is based on transmitting random bits on the ‘good bits’ of the degraded eavesdropper channel. These random
bits are independent of the secret message. At the legitimate receiver, the random bits can be decoded reliably.
This is because the ‘good bits’ for the degraded eavesdropper channel are also ‘good’ for the legitimate user. The
rest of the ‘good’ bits for the legitimate user are dedicated for the secret message. Additional independent works
on this subject are provided in [13] [14] [15].
Transmitting random bits on the ‘good bits’ of the eavesdropper, all the possible information rates that can be
detected by the eavesdropper are exhausted. Otherwise, the standard channel capacity could have been beaten. Thus
Eran Hof is the corresponding author (E-mail: eran.hof@gmail.com).
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the ‘good bits’ associated with the secret message for the legitimate channel, must be perfectly secret (at least in
the weak sense). Note that this result is satisfied immaterial of whether the eavesdropper adheres to successive
decoding or to optimal decoding (as otherwise, its capacity could have been beaten). It is first shown that the
provided scheme archives the secrecy capacity for the considered model. The result is then generalized to the enitre
rate-equivocation region. This result is proved under a weak notion of secrecy. For the particular case of binary
erasure wire-tap channel, an alternative proof is provided, based on algebraic arguments. This different notion of
proof may contribute to a stronger notion of security.
At the second part of the paper, the secrecy polar scheme is adapted for the general, i.e., non-degraded wire-tap
channel. This scheme is based on a conjecture on possible polarization properties of some of the ‘bad’ indices of the
eavesdropper. To this end, the polarization of the ’bad’ bits is concerned while the decoder has perfect knowledge
of some of the ’good’ bits (which are no longer part of the transmitted message, but they are kept predetermined
and fixed). The question regarding this aspect is whether the additional information helps in decoding these bits
or do they keep their original ’bad’ polarization. The original polarization result in [2] does not fully cover this
scenario.
This paper is structured as follows: In Section II preliminary introduction is provided. In Section II-A the wire-
tap communication model is introduced in addition to some basic definitions and results in information-theoretic
security. Polar codes are introduced in Section II-B. The polar secrecy scheme is detailed and studied in Section III.
A conjecture on possible polarization properties is stated in Section IV, along with a resulting adaptation of the
polar secrecy scheme for non-degraded wiretap channels. A list of possible further generalizations is provided in
Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. The Wire-Tap Communication Model
We consider the communication model in Figure 1. A coded system is presented which transmits a confidential
message U to a legitimate user. The message U is chosen uniformly from a set of size M . Next, the message is
encoded to a codeword X with a blocklength n over an alphabet X . The resulting code-rate is R = 1
n
logM . The
codeword X is transmitted over a communication channel PY,Z|X with one input, and two outputs. The transmission
is assumed to take place over a DMC P , with an input alphabet X , and output alphabets Y and Z . Let P (y, z|x)
denote the probability of receiving the vectors y ∈ Yn, and z ∈ Zn, at the legitimate user and the eavesdropper,
respectively, given that a codeword x ∈ X n is transmitted. Based on the assumption that the channel is memoryless,
it follows that
P (y, z|x) =
n∏
k=1
P (yk, zk|xk)
where (with some abuse of notation) P (y, z|x) denotes the probability of receiving the symbols y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z ,
at the legitimate user and the eavesdropper, respectively, given that the symbol x ∈ X is transmitted. Moreover, let
G(y|x) and Q(z|x) denote the marginal probabilities for receiving the symbols y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z , at the legitimate
user and the eavesdropper, respectively, given that the symbol x ∈ X is transmitted. Both G(y|x) and Q(z|x)
are transition probability laws of DMCs, called the marginal channels of the legitimate user and the eavesdropper,
respectively. In addition, the probability to receive the symbol z ∈ Z at the eavesdropper, given that the symbol
y ∈ Y is received at the legitimate user is denoted by D(z|y).
The channel output vectors Y and Z, both of length n, are received by the legitimate user and the eavesdropper,
respectively. The legitimate user decodes the received vector Y resulting in the decoded message Uˆ . The objectives
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Fig. 1: A wire-tap communication model.
of the considered coding system is to obtain both secure and reliable communication. These objectives are to be
accomplished simultaneously using a single codebook Cn. The reliability of the system is measured via the average
error probability Pe(Cn) of the decoded message
Pe(Cn) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
Pr
(
Uˆ 6= m| U = m
)
.
Note that the error probability depends on the blocklength of the coded message. The level of security is measured
by the equivocation rate
Re(Cn) ,
1
n
H(U |Z) (1)
where H(U |Z) denotes the conditional entropy of the transmitted message U , given the received vector Z at the
eavesdropper.
Definition 1 (Achievable rate-equivocation pair). A rate-equivocation pair (R,Re) is achievable if there exists a
code sequence {Cn} of block length n and rate R such that
lim
n→∞
Pe(Cn) = 0
Re ≤ lim
n→∞
Re(Cn).
Remark 1 (On strong and weak notions of secrecy). The current discussion considers normalized entropies to
measure the level of security (see the definition of equivocation rate in (1)). Therefore, the achieved secrecy notion
is referred to as weak secrecy. The strong notion of secrecy considers the unnormalized mutual information between
the confidential message and the received vector at the eavesdropper receiver. Strong secrecy guarantees secrecy in
the weak sense while the opposite direction does not follow.
Definition 2 (Secrecy capacity). The secrecy capacity Cs is the supremum of all the rates R, such that the pair
(R,R) is an achievable rate-equivocation pair.
Theorem 1 (The secrecy capacity of the wire-tap channel [1]). The secrecy capacity Cs of the wire-tap channel
satisfies:
Cs = max
PUXPYZ|X
(
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)
)
where U is an auxilary random variable over the alphabet U , satisfying
4 SUBMITTED TO THE IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, MAY 2010.
1) Markov relationship: U → X → (Y,Z) is a Markov chain.
2) Bounded cardinality: |U| ≤ X + 1.
Binary-input symmetric wire-tap channels are considered in this paper.
Definition 3 (Symmetric binary input channels). A DMC with a transition probability p, binary-input alphabet
X , and an output alphabet Y is said to be symmetric if there exists a permutation π over Y such that
1) The inverse permutation π−1 is equal to π, i.e.,
π−1(y) = π(y)
for all y ∈ Y .
2) The transition probability p satisfies
p(y|0) = p(π(y)|1)
for all y ∈ Y .
Definition 4 (Symmetric binary-input wire-tap channels). A binary input discrete memoryless wire-tap channel
is symmetric if both of its marginal channels are symmetric.
The particular case of physically degraded channels is studied in this paper.
Definition 5 (Physically degraded channels). Let P be a wire-tap channel with an input alphabet X and output
alphabets Y and Z , at the legitimate and eavesdropper, respectively. Then, P is said to be physically degraded if
P (y, z|x) = G(y|x)D(z|y) (2)
for all x ∈ X , y ∈ Y , and z ∈ Z .
The following Theorem characterizes the secrecy capacity of a binary-input, memoryless, symmetric and degraded
wire-tap channel:
Theorem 2 ([1]). Let P be a binary-input, memoryless, symmetric, and degraded wire-tap channel. Denote by
GY |X and QZ|X the marginal channels to the legitimate user and the eavesdropper, respectively. Then, the secrecy
capacity Cs is given by
Cs(P ) = C(GY |X)− C(QZ|X)
where C(GY |X) and C(QZ|X) are the channel capacities of the marginal channel GY |X and QZ|X , respectively.
Remark 2 (On the entire rate-equivocation region). Theorem 2 is a particular case of the rate-equivocation
region of less-noisy channels (which is on its own a particular case of the rate-equivocation region of the wire-tap
channel). Under the notation in Theorem 1, if I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z) for every U satisfying the Markov relationship in
Theorem 1, then the channel to the legitimate receiver is said to be less noisy than the eavesdropper (the degradation
assumption in (2) satisfies the less noisy condition). It can be shown for the case of less-noisy wire-tap channels,
that the rate-equivocation region is given by
⋃
PXPYZ|X

(R,Re) :
0 ≤ R ≤ I(X;Y )
0 ≤ Re ≤ R
Re ≤ I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)

 .
For further details and proof see [1] and references therein. In the particular case of binary-input, memoryless
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symmetric and degraded wire-tap channels as in Theorem 2, the rate-equivocation region is therefore given by
(R,Re) :
0 ≤ R ≤ C(GY |X)
0 ≤ Re ≤ R
Re ≤ C(GY |X)− C(QZ|X)

 . (3)
B. Polar Codes
This preliminary section offers a minimal summary of the basic definitions and results in [2], [3], that are essential
to the presentation of the results in Section III.
Let p be a transition probability function of a DMC with a binary input-alphabet X = {0, 1} and an output
alphabet Y . The operation of the channel on vectors is also denoted by p, that is for x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n, and
y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Y
n
, the block transition probability is given by
p(y|x) =
n∏
l=1
p(yl|xl).
Polar codes are defined in this section using the following recursive construction. At the first step, two independent
copies of p are combined to form a new channel p2 over an input alphabet X 2 and output alphabet Y2. The transition
probability function of the combined channel is given by
p2(y1, y2|u1, u2) = p(y1|w1 + w2)p(y2|w2) (4)
for all y1, y2 ∈ Y , and w1, w2 ∈ X , where the addition operation is carried modulo 2. At the i-th step of the
construction, the transition probability function pn, n = 2i, is defined for a combined channel with an input
alphabet X n and an output alphabet Yn. The recursive definition of pn is based on two independent copies of the
channel pn
2
defined at the previous step (i− 1). The channel pn
2
has an input alphabet X n2 and an output alphabet
Y
n
2 . The construction of the channel pn includes the following steps:
1) An input vector w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ X n is first transformed to a vector s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ X n where
s2k−1 = w2k−1 + w2k
and
s2k = x2k, 1 ≤ k ≤
n
2
where the addition is carried modulo 2.
2) The vector s is transformed into a vector v ∈ X n where
v = (s1, s3, . . . , sn−1, s2, s4, . . . , sn).
i.e., the first n2 elements of v, v1, . . . , vn2 equal the elements in s with odd indices, and the rest
n
2 elements of
v, vn
2
+1, . . . , vn equal the elements of s with even indices. This operation is called a reverse shuffle operation
and can be described by the linear transformation
v = sRn
where Rn is an n× n matrix, called the reverse shuffle operator.
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3) pn(y|w) is given by
pn(y|w) = pn
2
((
y1, y2, . . . , yn
2
)
|
(
v1, v2, . . . , vn
2
))
pn
2
((
yn
2
+1, yn
2
+2, . . . , yn
)
|
(
vn
2
+1, vn
2
+2, . . . , vn
))
.
(5)
The recursive channel-synthesizing operation of pn is referred to as channel combining, and the channel pn is
referred to as the combined channel. Note that the resulting block length n for this construction must be a power
of 2, that is n = 2i for i ∈ N. Throughout this paper, all block lengths n are assumed to be integral powers of 2.
The recursive construction of pn can be equivalently defined using a linear encoding operation. Let
F =
(
1 0
1 1
)
and define the following recursive construction of the n× n matrices Gn:
G1 =I1
Gn =
(
In
2
⊗ F
)
Rn
(
I2 ⊗Gn
2
)
(6)
where Il is the l× l identity matrix and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product for matrices. The matrix Gn is refereed
to as the polar generator matrix of size n.
Proposition 1 ([2]). Let p be a DMC, and let pn be the combined channel with a block length n. Then,
pn(y|w) = p(y|wGn) (7)
for all y ∈ Yn and w ∈ Xn, where pn is the combined channel in (5) and Gn is the n× n matrix defined in (6).
Denote by [n] , {1, 2, . . . , n}, and let An ⊆ [n]. In addition, denote by Acn the complementary set of An, that
is Acn = [n] \ An. Given a set An, a class of coset codes with a common code-rate 1n |An| are formed. Over the
indices specified by An, the components of the input vector w are set according to the information bit vector. The
rest of the bits of w are predetermined and fixed according to the particular code design. By setting both the set
An and the components of w specified by Acn, a particular coset code is defined. This code can be shown to be a
block coset code. The set An is referred as the information set. Polar codes are constructed by a specific choice of
the information set An. Moreover, the choice of the information set is tailored to the specific channel over which
the communication takes place.
A coset code is defined using a linear block code and a coset vector. Let G be a generator matrix for a binary
(n, k) linear block code with block length n and dimension k. In addition, let c ∈ X n be a binary vector. Then,
the coset block code C(G, c) is defined by
C(G, c) ,
{
x : x = uG+ c, u ∈ X k
}
. (8)
Denote by Gn(An) the |An| ×n sub-matrix of Gn, defined by the rows of Gn whose indices are in An. Similarly,
the matrix Gn(Ac) denotes the |Acn| × n sub-matrix of Gn formed by the remaining rows of Gn. For each choice
of An and an arbitrary n− k binary vector b ∈ Xn−k, a coset code C is defined according to
C = C
(
Gn (An) ,bGn (A
c
n)
)
. (9)
This code coincides with the recursive construction in (7). To see this, plug the information vector u in the
information indices, specified by An, of the input vector w to the recursive construction. In addition, plug the
vector b in the rest of the components of w .
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Channel splitting is another important operation that is introduced in [2] for polar coding. The split channels
{p
(l)
n }nl=1, with a binary input alphabet X and output alphabets Yn × X l−1, 1 ≤ l ≤ n, are defined according to:
p(l)n (y,w|x) =
1
2n−1
∑
c∈Xn−l
pn
(
y|(w, x, c)
) (10)
where y ∈ Yn, w ∈ X l−1, and x ∈ X . The channel synthesizing operation in (10) is referred to as channel splitting
operation. The Bhattacharyya parameter of p(l)n is denoted by:
B(p(l)n ) ,
∑
y∈Yn
∑
w∈X l−1
√
p
(l)
n (y,w|0)p
(k)
n (y,w|1). (11)
The construction of the sequence of sets of split channels {p(l)n (y,w|x)}nl=1, n = 2i, i ∈ N, in (10) can be described
using the following alternative recursion:
Proposition 2 ([2]). For all i > 0, 1 ≤ l ≤ 2i,
p
(2l−1)
2i+1
(
(y(1),y(2)),w|w1
)
=
∑
w∈X
1
2
p
(l)
2i
(
y(1), g(w)|w1 + w
)
p
(l)
2i
(
y(2), e(w)|w
) (12)
p
(2l)
2i+1
(
(y(1),y(2)), (w, w1)|w2
)
=
1
2
p
(l)
2i
(
y(1), g(w)|w1 + w2
)
p
(l)
2i
(
y(2), e(w)|w2
) (13)
where y(1),y(2) ∈ Y2i , w = (w1, . . . , w2l−2) ∈ X 2l−2, w1, w2 ∈ X , the addition operation is carried modulo 2
and g = (g1, . . . , gl−1) = g(w) is a vector in X l−1 defined according to
gj = w2j−1 + w2j , 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1 (14)
and
e(w) = (w2, w4, . . . , w2l−2) (15)
is the vector in X l−1 comprises from the components of x with even indices.
The importance of channel splitting is in its role in the successive cancellation decoding procedure that is provided
in [2]. The error performance analysis of this decoding procedure relies on the following two results:
Theorem 3 ([3]). Let p be a binary-input symmetric DMC with capacity C(p), and fix an arbitrary rate R < C(p)
and a positive constant β < 12 . Then, there exists a sequence of information sets An ⊂ [n], where n = 2
i
, i ∈ N,
such that for large enough blocklengths n the following properties are satisfied:
1) Rate:
|An| ≥ nR.
2) Performance: The Bhattacharyya parameters in (11) satisfy
B(p(l)n ) ≤ 2
−nβ
for every l ∈ An.
Proposition 3 ([2]). Assume that the vector w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ X n is encoded via the considered recursive
construction in (7), and is transmitted over a memoryless and symmetric DMC channel p with a binary-input
alphabet X and an output alphabet Y . Define the event
El(p) ,
{
p(l)n (y,w
(l−1)|wl) ≤ p
(l)
n (y,w
(l−1)|wl + 1)
}
(16)
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where y ∈ Yn is the received vector, w(l−1) = (w1, . . . , wl−1) is the vector comprises of the first l− 1 bits of w,
p
(l)
n is the split channel in (10) and the addition is carried modulo 2. Then, the event El is independent with the
actual input vector w and
Pr
(
El(p)
)
≤ B
(
p(l)n
)
where B(p(l)n ) is the Bhattacharyya parameter in (11).
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME: THE PHYSICALLY DEGRADED CASE
A. Polar Coding for Degraded Wire-Tap Channels
Coset Block Codes
A polar coding scheme is defined for the wire-tap channel. The proposed scheme is defined using the notion of
coset block codes, based on the polar generator matrix GN introduced in Section II-B. For a given block length
n = 2i, i ∈ N, let An be an arbitrary subset of [n] of size k. In addition, let Nn be an additional arbitrary subset
of Acn, of size k∗, and let bn ∈ X n−k−k
∗ be a length n− k− k∗ binary vector. Denote by Bn the set of remaining
indices in Acn, that is
Bn , A
c
n \ Nn. (17)
The sets An, Bn, and Nn, the polar generator matrix Gn and the vector bn are all known to both the legitimate
user and the eavesdropper.
Let u ∈ X k be a confidential information bit vector that needs to be transmitted to the legitimate user. The
operation of the proposed secrecy scheme is described as follows:
1) A binary vector b∗n ∈ X k
∗ is chosen uniformly at random.
2) The coset block code C∗n is chosen according to
C∗n = C
(
Gn(An),bnGn(Bn) + b
∗
nGn(Nn)
)
. (18)
3) The information vector u is encoded into a codeword x using the coset block code C∗n. That is,
x = uGn(An) + bnGn(Bn) + b
∗
nGn(Nn) (19)
and it is transmitted over the wire-tap channel.
If the complexity of constructing a random vector is considered as O(1), then the encoding complexity of the
proposed scheme equals the encoding complexity of the single-user polar encoding in [2], which is O(n log n).
For given sets An and Nn, and a vector bn, the resulting coding scheme is denoted by Cn(An,Nn,bn). Since
symmetric channels are considered, the performance of the provided scheme is shown in the following to be
independent with the actual choice of bn. Consequently, the suggested coding scheme is denoted by Cn(An,Nn).
Recursive Polar Construction
An equivalent recursive construction of the proposed scheme is provided. Similarly to the single-user construction
in (4), the first step of the recursive construction is the composition of the wiretap channel P2 with an input alphabet
from X 2 and an output alphabet from Y2 ×Z2
P2(y1, y2, z1, z2|w1, w2) = P (y1, z1|w1 +w2)P (y2, z2|w2) (20)
where (y1, y2) ∈ Y2, (z1, z2) ∈ Z2, (w1, w2) ∈ X 2, and the addition is carried modulo 2.
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The continuation of the recursive construction follows in a similar manner to the recursion in Section II-B; The
transition probability function Pn for a channel with an input alphabet X n and an output alphabet Yn × Zn, is
constructed using two independent copies of a channel Pn
2
with an input alphabet X n2 and an output alphabet
Y
n
2 ×Z
n
2 . Note that as in Section II-B, all block lengths (n) are integral powers of 2. The first part of the recursive
step includes the evaluation of the vectors s,v ∈ X n. This part is identical to the construction as described in
Section II-B (steps 1 and 2). Finally, the transition probability function Pn(y|x) is given by
Pn(y, z|x) =Pn
2
(
(y1, y2, . . . , yn
2
), (z1, z2, . . . , zn
2
)|(v1, v2, . . . , vn
2
)
)
· Pn
2
(
(yn
2
+1, yn
2
+2, . . . , yn), (zn
2
+1, zn
2
+2, . . . , zn)|(vn
2
+1, vn
2
+2, . . . , vn)
)
. (21)
The channel Pn in (21) is the combined wire-tap channel.
As in the case of standard polar coding for the single-user model, the recursive construction can be shown to be
equivalent to a linear encoding with the polar generator matrix Gn:
Proposition 4. Let P be a binary memoryless wire-tap channel with an input alphabet X and output alphabets
Y and Z , for the legitimate user and the eavesdropper, respectively. In addition, let Pn and Gn be the combined
wire-tap channel in (21) and the polar generator matrix in (6), respectively. Then,
Pn(y, z|w) = P (y, z|wGn) (22)
for all w ∈ X n, y ∈ Yn, and z ∈ Zn.
Proof: The proof of (22) is identical to the proof of (7) in [2], where symbols from the output alphabet of the
single user channel are replaced with the corresponding pair of symbols from the composite output alphabet (of
the legitimate and the eavesdropper channels).
To obtain the equivalence of the recursive construction of the combined channel Pn in (21) with the encoding
operation in (19), the division of the components of w in (22) for information bits, random bits and predetermined
and fixed bits, is detailed. This division is defined by the sets An and Nn as follows:
1) Over the indices specified by the index set An, the information bits u are placed.
2) The random bits b∗n are placed in the indices specified by Nn.
3) The predetermined and fixed bits in bn are left for the remaining indices specified by Bn.
Plugging u, b∗n, and bn in wGn, results in the coded message x in (19).
Channel Splitting and Degradation Properties
The channel splitting operation in (10) is repeated for the case of wire-tap channels. This procedure can be
carried in two different but equivalent options:
1) First performing a channel splitting operation for the wire-tap channel. This operation results in the split
wire-tap channels {P (l)n }nl=1 with a binary input alphabet X and an output alphabet Yn ×Zn ×X l−1:
P (l)n (y, z,w|w) ,
1
2n−1
∑
c∈Xn−l
Pn
(
y, z|(w, w, c)
) (23)
where y ∈ Yn, z ∈ Zn, w ∈ X l−1, and w ∈ X . Next, deriving the marginal split channels
G(l)n (y,w|w) ,
∑
z∈Zn
P (l)n (y, z,w|w) (24)
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and
Q(l)n (z,w|w) ,
∑
y∈Yn
P (l)n (y, z,w|w) (25)
for the legitimate-user and eavesdropper, respectively, where y, z, w, and w are as in (23).
2) First deriving the marginal combined channels:
Gn(y|w) ,
∑
z∈Zn
Pn(y, z|w) (26)
and
Qn(z|w) ,
∑
y∈Yn
Pn(y, z|w) (27)
for the legitimate user and eavesdropper, respectively, where y ∈ Yn, z ∈ Zn, and w ∈ X n. Next, split the
marginal combined channels in (26) and (27) according to
1
2n−1
∑
c∈Xn−l
Gn
(
y|(w, w, c)
)
. (28)
and
1
2n−1
∑
c∈Xn−l
Qn
(
z|(w, w, c)
) (29)
where y, z, w, and w are as in (23).
It is an immediate consequence of the equivalence properties in (7) and (22), that the split channels in (24) and
(25) equal to the channels in (28) and (29).
The following proposition considers physically degraded wire-tap channels:
Proposition 5. Assume that the wire-tap channel P is physically degraded. Then, the split channel P (l)n (y, z,w|x)
in (23) satisfies
P (l)n (y, z,w|x) = G
(l)
n (y,w|x)D(z|y) (30)
where G(l)n is the marginal split channel of the legitimate user in (24), y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Yn, z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈
Zn, u ∈ X l−1, x ∈ X , D(z|y) is a memoryless transition probability law:
D(z|y) =
n∏
l=1
D(zi|yi)
and D(z|y) is the conditional probability law of receiving a symbol z ∈ Z at the eavesdropper, assuming that the
symbol y ∈ Y is received at the legitimate receiver.
Proof: The recursion operation in Proposition 2 is valid for the wire-tap channel. Specifically, for all i > 0
and 1 ≤ l ≤ 2i it follows that
P
(2l−1)
2i+1
(
(y(1),y(2)), (z(1), z(2)),w|w1
)
=
∑
w∈X
1
2
P
(l)
2i
(
y(1), z(1), g(w)|w1 + w
)
P
(l)
2i
(
y(2), z(2), e(w)|w
) (31)
P
(2l)
2i+1
(
(y(1),y(2)), (z(1), z(2)), (w, w1)|w2
)
=
1
2
P
(l)
2i
(
y(1), z(1), g(w)|w1 + w2
)
P
(l)
2i
(
y(2), z(2), e(w)|w2
) (32)
where y(1),y(2) ∈ Y2i , z(1), z(2) ∈ Z2i , w ∈ X 2l−2, w1, w2 ∈ X , and g(w) and e(w) are as defined in (14)
and (15), respectively. The proof of the recursion property in (31) and (32) follows the exact derivation as in [2]
(while replacing the output alphabet of the single-user channel with the combined outputs of the legitimate user
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and the eavesdropper).
From (26), (31), and (32), a similar recursion follows for the marginal split channel G(l)n (y,w|x) of the legitimate
user. To this end, the recursion operations in (12) and (13) are satisfied where p(2l−1)2i+1 , p
(l)
2i and p
(2l)
2i+1 are replaced
by G(2l−1)2i+1 , G
(l)
2i and G
(2l)
2i+1 , respectively.
The proof of the degradation in (30) is accomplished by induction. At the first step, from (31) and (32) it follows
that
P
(1)
2
(
(y1, y2), (z1, z2)|w1
)
=
∑
w∈X
1
2
P
(
y1, z1|w1 + w
)
P
(
y2, z2|w
) (33)
P
(2)
2
(
(y1, y2), (z1, z2), w1|w2
)
=
1
2
P
(
y1, z1|w1 + w2
)
P
(
y2, z2|w2
)
. (34)
Then, plugging (2) in (33) and (34) concludes the proof for the first step. Next, assume that the split channel P (l)2i
satisfies the degradation property in (30). That is, assume that
P
(l)
2i (y, z,w
′|w) = G
(l)
2i (y,w
′|w)D(z|y) (35)
for all 1 ≤ l ≤ 2i, y ∈ Y2i , z ∈ Z2i , w′ ∈ X l−1, and w ∈ X . Then, from (31) and (35) it follows that
P
(2l−1)
2i+1
(
(y(1),y(2)), (z(1), z(2)),w|w1
)
=
∑
w∈X
1
2
G
(l)
2i
(
y(1), g(w)|w1 + w
)
D(z(1)|y(1))
G
(l)
2i
(
y(2), e(w)|w
)
D(z(2)|y(2))
=G
(2l−1)
2i+1
(
(y(1),y(2)),w|w1
)
D
(
(z(1), z(2))|(y(1),y(2))
)
where the last step follows using the recursion properties of the marginal split channel for the legitimate user. A
similar argument assures the degradation property for P (2l)2i+1 which concludes the proof of the proposition.
Successive Cancellation Decoding
The successive cancellation decoding procedure in [2] is applied for the legitimate user. The difference from the
standard single-user case is that for the wire-tap channel model the legitimate user needs to decode both the message
u ∈ X k and the noisy vector b∗n ∈ X k
∗
. In terms of information sets, the legitimate receiver operates on the indices
specified by both An and Nn. Denote by w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ X n the transmitted vector over the combined channel
Pn, then w is composed from the information vector u, the random vector b∗n, and the predetermined fixed vector
bn. It is important not to confuse w with the actual codeword x in (19), which is transmitted over the given wire-
tap channel P . Both interpretations are equivalent as the coset block code is equivalent to the recursive combining
construction. Nevertheless, the decoding rule (and its performance analysis in the following) is characterized in
terms of the vector w, transmitted over the combined wire-tap channel and received over the marginal split channels
for the legitimate user.
The decoding rule operates recursively to compute the length-n decoded vector wˆ = (wˆ1, . . . , wˆn) ∈ X n. Let
1 ≤ l ≤ n, and assume that the first l − 1 components of wˆ, denoted by wˆ(l−1), are already evaluated. If l 6∈ A¯n,
where
A¯n , An ∪Nn.
then the current index l is not in the information index set An and not in the indices specified in Nn for the noisy
vector. Consequently, l ∈ Bn. Recall that for the indices specified by Bn, the predetermined vector bn is set. Since
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bn is predetermined and known (both to the legitimate user and the eavesdropper), wl is known at the receiver and
therefore it is possible to set
wˆl = wl.
If l ∈ A¯n, then the current index is identified either as an information bit in u or as a noisy bit in b∗n. For this
case, the following decoding rule is applied to the marginal split channel G(l)n in (24):
wˆl =
{
0 if G(l)n (y, wˆ(l−1)|0) ≥ G(l)n (y, wˆ(l−1)|1)
1 else
. (36)
The successive cancellation decoding described in this section, is by no mean optimal. This important observation
is already noted for the single-user case in [2]. Nevertheless, for an uncoded communication model with a
communication channel whose transition probability function is G(l)n , the detection rule for the single bit wl in (36)
is optimal, if wl is an equiprobable bit.
B. A Secrecy Achieving Property for Degraded Channels
Theorem 4. Let P be a binary-input, memoryless, degraded and symmetric wire-tap channel with a secrecy capacity
Cs(P ). Fix an arbitrary positive β < 12 , and R < Cs(P ). Then, there exist sequences of sets An and Nn such that
the secrecy coding scheme Cn(An,Nn) satisfies the following properties:
1) Rate: For a sufficiently large block length n
R ≤
1
n
|An|. (37)
2) Security: The equivocation rate Re(Cn(An,Nn) satisfies
lim
n→∞
Re
(
Cn(An,Nn)
)
≥ R. (38)
3) Reliability: The average block error probability under successive cancellation decoding Pe(Cn(A,N )) satisfies
Pe
(
Cn(An,Nn)
)
= o
(
2−n
β
)
.
Proof:
The proof comprises of three parts: A code construction part where the construction of the sets An and Nn is
described in details, along with the derivation of the coding rate property in (37). An analysis of the equivocation
rate is provided in the second part of the proof. Finally, in the third part an upper bound on the block error
probability at the legitimate receiver is provided under successive cancellation decoding.
Part I: The code construction
Fix some r∗ = C(PZ|X) − ǫ, and r = C(PY |X) − ǫ, where C(PY |X) and C(PZ|X) are the channel capacities
of the marginal channels for the legitimate user and the eavesdropper, and ǫ > 0 is determined later. According to
Theorem 3, there exists a sequence of index sets N˜n ⊂ [n], satisfying:
1) The cardinality of the index set N˜n satisfies
|N˜n| ≥ ⌊nr
∗⌋. (39)
2) For all l ∈ N˜ , the Bhattacharyya parameter B(Q(l)n ) of the split channel Q(l)n of the eavesdropper in (25), is
upper bounded by
B(Q(l)n ) ≤ 2
−nβ . (40)
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The index set Nn of size ⌊nr∗⌋ is chosen arbitrary from N˜n.
Next, Theorem 3 is applied for the marginal channel of the legitimate user. Accordingly, there exists a sequence
of index sets A˜n ⊂ [n], satisfying:
1) The cardinality of the index set A˜n satisfies
|A˜n| ≥ ⌊nr⌋. (41)
2) For all l ∈ A˜n, the Bhattacharyya parameter B(G(l)n ) of the split channel G(l)n of the legitimate user in (28),
is upper bounded according to
B(G(l)n ) ≤ 2
−nβ . (42)
For each n, the information index set An of size ⌊nr⌋ − ⌊nr∗⌋ is chosen from A˜n \ Nn. As |Nn| = ⌊nr∗⌋ and
|A˜n| ≥ ⌊nr⌋, the set A˜n\Nn is of sufficient size. The specific choice of An may be carried arbitrarily. Nevertheless,
the best choice is to pick the indices in A˜n\Nn whose corresponding marginal split-channels for the legitimate-user
have the lowest Bhattacharyya parameters.
The code rate of the resulting scheme satisfies
1
n
|An| ≥
r − 1
n
−
r∗ − 1
n
= C(PY |X)− C(PZ|X)− 2ǫ−
2
n
= Cs(P )− 2ǫ−
2
n
(43)
where the last equality follows from Theorem 2. Consequently, for a large enough block length and a properly
chosen (small) ǫ, the code rate of the proposed scheme satisfies (37).
The choice of the vector bn ∈ X n−k−k
∗
may be carried arbitrarily.
Part II: The equivocation rate analysis
The confidential message vector, the transmitted codeword, and the received vector at the eavesdropper are denoted
by the random vectors U, X, and Z, respectively. The equivocation rate of the proposed scheme Re
(
Cn(A,N )
)
is
given by
Re
(
Cn(A,N )
)
=
1
n
H(U|Z)
=
1
n
H(U)−
1
n
I(U;Z)
=
1
n
|An| −
1
n
I(U;Z) (44)
Where the last equality follows since the message bit vector is of length |An| and equiprobable. Using the chain
rule of mutual information
I(U,X;Z) =I(U;Z) + I(X;Z|U)
=I(X;Z) + I(U;Z|X).
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Consequently,
I(U;Z) =I(X;Z) + I(U;Z|X) − I(X;Z|U)
(a)
=I(X;Z)− I(X;Z|U)
≤nC(PZ|X)− I(X;Z|U) (45)
where (a) follows since U→ X→ Z is a Markov chain which implies that Z and U are statistically independent
given X, and C(PZ|X) is the channel capacity of the marginal channel to the eavesdropper. The conditional mutual
information I(X;Z|U) is given by
I(X;Z|U) =H(X|U) −H(X|U,Z)
(a)
= |Nn| −H(X|U,Z)
(b)
≥n
(
C(PZ|X)− ǫ
)
− 1−H(X|U,Z) (46)
where (a) follows since the binary vector b∗ is chosen uniformly at random and it is independent with the confidential
message, and (b) follows since |Nn| = ⌊nr∗⌋ and r∗ = C(PZ|X)− ǫ.
Let Pe|U denote the error probability of a decoder that needs to decode X while having access to both the
eavesdropper observation vector Z, the confidential message vector U, and the predetermined vector bn (which is
fixed, predetermined, and known to all the users in the model). Note that if both the confidential message U and the
predetermined vector bn are known at the receiver, then the remaining uncertainty in the codeword X relates only
to the random vector b∗n of size Nn. Using Fano’s inequality (see, e.g., [5]), the conditional entropy H(X|U,Z)
is bounded according to
H(X|U,Z) ≤h2(Pe|U) + Pe|U log(2
|Nn| − 1)
≤h2(Pe|U) + nr
∗Pe|U (47)
where h2(x) , −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x) is the binary entropy function. from (44)-(47) it follows that
Re
(
Cn(A,N )
)
≥
1
n
|An| − ǫ−
1
n
−
1
n
(
h2
(
Pe|U
)
+ nr∗Pe|U
) (48)
≥R−
1
n
−
1
n
(
h2
(
Pe|U
)
+ nr∗Pe|U
) (49)
where the last inequality follows from (43) for a sufficiently small ǫ and a sufficiently large n. The error probability
Pe|U in (49) can be upper bounded by the error probability under the suboptimal successive cancellation decoder
in [2], which is fully informed with both the predetermined vector bn and the confidential message vector U. It
follows from [3] that
Pe|U ≤ o(2
−nβ )
which concludes the proof of (38).
Part III: The error performance at the legitimate decoder
The successive cancellation decoding procedure at the legitimate receiver is analyzed. First, fix a vector w =
(w1, . . . , wn) ∈ X
n comprises of the information message u ∈ X k, the randomly chosen vector b∗ ∈ X k∗ , and
the predetermined vector b ∈ X n−k−k∗ . The conditional block error probability is denoted by Pe|w. That is, Pe|w
is the probability of a block error event given that the input vector is w. Denote by w(l) = (w1, . . . , wl) the first l
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bits of w, and by wˆ(l) = (wˆ1, . . . , wˆl) the first l decoded bits. The event
Fl ,
{
w(l−1) = wˆ(l−1), wl 6= wˆl
}
corresponds to the case where the first l − 1 bits of w are decoded correctly and the first decoding error is in the
l-th bit. Notice that
Fl ⊂ El(G
l
n)
where El is the event defined in (16), and Gln is the marginal split channel in (24). Consequently, it follows using
the union bound that
Pe|w =Pr
(
∪nl=1Fl| w
)
≤
∑
l∈A¯n
Pr
(
El(G
(l)
n )| w
)
. (50)
Next, the summation in (50) is split to two summations: a summation over the indices in An and a summation
over the indices in Nn. For an index l ∈ An, it follows from Proposition 3 that for all w ∈ X n
Pr
(
El(G
(l)
n )| w
)
≤ B(G(l)n ) (51)
where B(G(l)n ) is the Bhattacharyya parameter in (11). To address the probability of the event El(G(l)n ) where
l ∈ Nn, notice that at the output of the marginal split channel, the decoding rule for wl in (36) is optimal1. Recall
the degradation property in Proposition 5. According to Proposition 5 the marginal split channel of the eavesdropper
is physically degraded with respect to the marginal split channel of the legitimate user. Consequently, it is clearly
suboptimal to first degrade the observations at the split channel of the legitimate user, and only then to detect the
bit wl over the corresponding marginal split channel of the eavesdropper. Specifically, wl is detected according to
wˆl =
{
0 if Q(l)n (z, wˆ(l−1)|0) ≥ Q(l)n (z, wˆ(l−1)|1)
1 else
where z ∈ Zn is a degraded version of y ∈ Yn, randomly picked according to the probability law D(z|y) in (30).
This detection rule is inferior with respect to (36). Hence, based on Proposition 3, the upper bound
Pr
(
El(G
(l)
n )| w
)
≤ B(Q(l)n ) (52)
holds for all l ∈ Nn. From (50), (51), and (52), it follows that the average block error probability is upper bounded
by
Pe(Cn(A,N )) ≤
∑
l∈An
B(G(l)n ) +
∑
l∈Nn
B(Q(l)n ).
The proof concludes using the bound on the polarization rate of the Bhattacharyya parameter in Theorem 3 and
the specific choice of the sets An and Nn.
Remark 3 (On communicating with full capacity). The noisy bits b∗n, defining the coset block code C∗n based
on the noisy index set Nn (see eq. (18)), are reliably detected by the legitimate user. It is therefore suggested to
utilize these bits in order to communicate with the legitimate user. That is, instead of setting the bits in b∗n to noisy
random bits, non-secret information bits are suggested to be set on b∗n. The non-secret information bits must be
statistically independent and equiprobable. In addition, the non-secret information must be statistically independent
1As stated, this optimality is only under the setting of the split channel, and by no means implies optimality of the complete procedure
(which is clearly suboptimal).
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with the secret-information. These statistical properties allows the non-secret information bits to act as if they are
noisy bits (where the eavesdropper is concerned). As a result of the cardinality of the index set An (41), the overall
rate, including secret and non-secret information, is arbitrarily close the full (marginal) channel capacity of the
legitimate user C(PY |X).
Remark 4 (The noisy bits must not be fixed). It is important to note that the bits in b∗n must be chosen at random
for each block transmission. To see this, first note (based on the data processing inequality) that
1
n
I(b∗n;Z) ≤
1
n
I(X;Z) (53)
for all n > 0. Assuming that (53) is satisfied with equality. It follows that both the legitimate user and the
eavesdropper can reliably decoded the vector b∗n. Considering the current setting as if it is a broadcast communication
problem over the given channel, a broadcast scheme is therefore provided where we can reliably communicated
with the legitimate user at a rate arbitrarily close to its marginal capacity C(PY |X) and at the same time with
the eavesdropper at a (common) rate which is arbitrarily close to 1
n
I(X;Z). This violates the fundamental limit
imposed by the capacity region of the degraded broadcast channel (see, e.g., [5]). Consequently, it follows that
1
n
I(b∗n;Z) <
1
n
I(X;Z) (54)
for all n > 0. Next, since there is a one-to-one correspondence between the transmitted codeword X and the vector
pair which is comprised of the random bits b∗ and the confidential message U (the vector b is predetermined and
fixed), it follows that
1
n
I(X;Z) =
1
n
I(U,b∗;Z)
(a)
=
1
n
I(b∗;Z) +
1
n
I(U;Z|b∗) (55)
for all n > 0, where (a) follows by the chain rule of mutual information. Hence it is observed from (54) and (55)
that
1
n
I(U;Z|b∗) > 0
for all n. This assures that if the vector b∗ is known to the eavesdropper, for example by choosing a fixed b∗,
perfect secrecy can not be established, not even in the weak sense.
It is observed in [6], that if (R1, R1) is an achievable rate-equivocation pair and in addition, an additional
information rate R2 is achievable without secrecy (that is, in the ordinary notion of reliable communication), then
the (R1 + R2, R1) is also an achieved rate-equivocation pair. The other direction is also provided in [6, p. 411].
Following Remark 3 which suggests the option of communicating in full rate, and the observations in [6], it
is expected that the entire rate-equivocation region is obtained with polar coding. This result is provided in the
following corollary:
Corollary 1 (The entire rate-equivocation region is achievable with polar codes). Under the assumptions and
notation in Theorem 4, the entire rate-equivocation region is achievable with polar coding.
Proof: Take a rate-equivocation pair (R,Re) in the rate-equivocation region defined in (3). Define R1 = Re,
and R2 = R − R1. Note that R2 ≥ 0 as Re ≤ R. Consider the coset block code in (18). Since Re ≤ Cs(P ), the
rate R1 is achievable via the index set An. It is further detailed in the proof of Theorem 4, that the information
transmitted via the indices in An is secure. Specifically, it follows from (48) that the equivocation rate is arbitrarily
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close to 1
n
|An|. As explained in Remark 3, reliable communication (not necessarily secure) of an additional rate of
up to the capacity C(PY |X) of the marginal channel to the legitimate user, is achievable. Therefore, the additional
rate R2, is achievable either via the remaining indices in An and the vector b∗n corresponding to the indices in Nn.
C. Secrecy Achieving Properties for Erasure Wiretap Channels
In this section, a particular case of binary erasure wiretap channel is considered. Specifically, it is assumed that
the channel to the legitimate user is noiseless, and the channel to the eavesdropper is a binary erasure channel
(BEC) with an erasure probability δ, is considered. Recall that the set sequence Nn of the indices that correspond
to “good” split channel to the eavesdropper, is chosen as to achieve the capacity to the eavesdropper. As the channel
to the legitimate user is noiseless, that is y = x, the set sequence An and is set according to
An , [n] \ Nn. (56)
Note that for this particular case Bn = ∅. The resulting coding scheme is then a particular case of the coset coding
scheme in [12] where the base code is determine by the generator matrix Gn(Nn) and the actual coset is determined
by uGn(An) where u is the transmitted information bits (the secret message) and Gn is the polar generator matrix
for a block length n. Specifically, the codeword x is given, based on(19), by
x = uGn(An) + b
∗
nGn(Nn). (57)
The rate and reliability properties in this particular case follows immediately as a result of Theorem 4. That is,
the rate approaches the secrecy capacity, which in this case equals δ, and the legitimate user obviously can decode
the transmitted message. As in the second part of the proof of Theorem 4, the confidential message vector, the
transmitted codeword, and the received vector at the eavesdropper are denoted by the random vectors U, X, and
Z, respectively. The following lemma address the entropy measure H(U|Z).
Lemma 1. Under the assumption and notation for the consider binary erasure wiretap channel, the entropy H(U|Z)
satisfies
H(U|Z) ≥ nδ(1 − c2−n
β
)
where δ is the erasure probability of the wiretap channel, and c > 0.
Proof: Let us fix a particular realization of the channel erasure sequence 2. Denote by D the set of µ indices
which are not erased. That is, the eavesdropper received the bits Xi for every i ∈ D, and erasure symbols for
every index in Dc , [n] \ D. Consider the |Nn| × n matrix {Gn(Nn)}. As the generator matrix Gn for the polar
construction has a full rank (for every n in the construction), the matrix Gn(Nn) has a rank Nn. Therefore, it is
a generator matrix for a binary linear block code of dimension Nn. This code has a parity check matrix of size
|An| × n, denoted by Hn (recall that A is given by (56)). Since all the information bits are equiprobable, and
all the noisy bits are also equiprobable, the codeword X, given by (19), id uniformly distributed over all possible
binary vectors in {0, 1}n. Consequently, all the bits in X are independent and identically distributed uniform binary
random variables. Hence, H(X|Z) = n − µ. In addition, note that if the codeword X is known, then information
2This case is studied in [12], and some parts of the provided proof are based on proper presentation of the techniques developed in [12]
for the case at hand.
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bits U are fully determined for the considered polar coding scheme. It follows that
H(U|Z) = H(U|X,Z) +H(X|Z)−H(X|U,Z) (58)
= m− µ−H(X|U,Z). (59)
Note that (58) is a restatement of [12, Eq. (5)], and (59) is a restatement of [12, Eq. (6)].
Next, fix a realization Z = z ∈ {0, 1}n and U = u ∈ {0, 1}|An |. From (57), it follows that the erased bits
{Xi}i∈Dc satisfies the linear equations∑
i∈D
Xi (Hn)i = HnuGn (An) +
∑
i∈Dc
Xi (Hn)i (60)
where (Hn)i is the i-th column of the parity check matrix Hn. The number of solutions to (60) is given by
2
n−µ−d
(
{(Hn)i}i∈D
)
where d
(
{(Hn)i}i∈D
)
is the dimension of the linear space spanned by the the column vectors in {(Hn)i}i∈D.
Since all the solutions for the erasures Xi, i ∈ D, are equally likely, it follows that
H(X|U = u,Z = z) = n− µ− d
(
{(Hn)i}i∈D
)
. (61)
From (59) and (61), it follows that
H(U|Z) = Ed
(
{(Hn)i}i∈D
)
. (62)
As the information indices Nn for the eavesdropper are chosen such that it can decode the noisy bits b∗ with an
error probability of O(2−nβ ), it follows that
H(U|Z) ≥ E
(
d
(
{(Hn)i}i∈D
)
|, correct decoding
)
(1− c2−n
β
) (63)
= nδ(1− c2−n
β
) (64)
where c > 0 and δ is the erasure probability of the eavesdropper channel.
Remark 5 (All coset must be equally likely). In the current discussion, the secrecy polar coding scheme is applied
with Bn = ∅. This fact is crucial for the proof of Lemma 1. It is conjectured that this choice may be crucial to
achieve the entire secrecy capacity under the strong secrecy condition.
Remark 6 (On possible stronger notion of secrecy). Consider the conditions in Theorem 3. In particular, not
that the rate R < C(p) is kept fixed for the polarization structure of the code. If, it be possible to construct the
sequence of polar codes, with a sequence of blocklength dependent rates Rn having the property that
Rn ≥ C(p)−
α
nγ
(65)
where α > 0 and γ > 1 are arbitrarily fixed parameters. Then, it will follow as a corollary of Lemma 1 that a
strong notion of secrecy is guaranteed. That is, the entropy H(U|Z) is arbitrarily close to H(U). To see this, note
that if polarization is possible while satisfying (65), it follows that
|Nn| ≥ n
(
1− δ −
α
nγ
)
.
Consequently,
H(U) = |An| = n− |Nn| = nδ +
α
n1−γ
.
E. HOF AND S. SHAMAI: SECRECY-ACHIEVING POLAR-CODING FOR BINARY-INPUT MEMORYLESS SYMMETRIC WIRE-TAP CHANNELS19
Hence H(U|Z) is lower bounded by a quantity which is arbitrarily close H(U) as the blocklength increases. For
the particular case of the BEC, it follows from [2, Eq. (34)-(35)], that the considered question requires the analysis
of the following sequence
|{i ∈ [n] : Zin ≤ Ce
nβ}|
where {Zin}i∈[n] is a sequence, generated recursively according to
Z
(2i−1)
2k = 2Z
(i)
k −
(
Z
(i)
k
)2
Z
(2i)
2k =
(
Z
(i)
k
)2
.
where i ∈ [k] and Z(1)1 = δ.
IV. AN OPEN POLARIZATION PROBLEM AND THE GENERAL WIRETAP CHANNEL
An open polarization problem is presented in addition to a conjecture which suggests a possible solution. A polar
secrecy scheme for non-degraded wiretap channels is provided based on suggested conjecture.
A. On the polarization of the ‘bad’ indices
Let W = (W1, . . . ,Wn) be a random vector, where {Wi}ni=1 are statistically independent and equiprobable
Pr(Wi = 0) = Pr(Wi = 1) =
1
2 for all i ∈ [n]. The random vector W is polar encoded to a codeword X = GnW,
where Gn is the polar generator matrix of size n. The codeword X is transmitted over a binary input DMC p,
whose output alphabet is Y . The received vector is denoted by Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn). For a given vector W and a set
A ⊆ [n], the following notation is used
WA , (Wi1 , . . . Wi|A|)
where i1 < i2 < . . . < i|A| and ik ∈ A for all k ∈ [|A|]. Define the following quantities of mutual information
Ii , I(Wi;W[i−1],Y), i ∈ [n]. (66)
The following polarization of mutual information is the key result in [2], [3]:
Theorem 5 (On the polarization of mutual information [2]). Assume that p is a binary-input output-symmetric
DMC whose capacity is C(p), and fix 0 < δ < 1. Then,
lim
n→∞
(
1
n
∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : Ii ∈ (1− δ, 1]}∣∣∣
)
= C(p)
lim
n→∞
(
1
n
∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : Ii ∈ [0, δ)}∣∣∣
)
= 1− C(p).
Denote by An the set of indices for which the corresponding mutual information quantities Ii, i ∈ An, are
arbitrarily close to 1 bit (for a sufficiently large n). The set An is called the information index set. This is the very
same index set in Theorem 3, of ‘good’ split channels whose corresponding Bhattacharyya constants approach 0.
Let A′n ⊂ An and let Sn ⊆ Acn. We define the index sets
Dn , A
′
n ∪ Sn
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and
D(i)n ,
{
j ∈ Dn : j < i
}
, i ∈ [n].
A problem of interest lies in the |Dn| quantities of mutual information:
Ji , I(Wi;WD(i)n ,WDcn ,Y), i ∈ Dn. (67)
For the indices in A′n a straight froward answer is provided:
Lemma 2 (on the indices of ‘good’ split channels). Fix a 0 < δ < 1 and an index i ∈ A′n. For sufficiently large
n
Ji ≥ 1− δ.
Proof: As the mutual information Ii in (66) includes a subset of the random variables in Ji in (67), it follows
that
Ji ≥ Ii.
The proof concludes using Theorem 5 as A′n ⊂ An.
According to Lemma 2 ‘good’ indices for which the mutual information quantities Ii approach 1 bit, remain
‘good’ with respect to the mutual information Ji. The characterization of the ’bad’ indices seems at this point to
be a greater challenge. A conjecture for possible polarization properties of the mutual information quantities Ji
in (67) is provided for the (‘bad’) indices in Sn. Two possible polarization properties are considered:
Conjecture 1 (On possible polarization dichotomy). Fix a 0 < δ < 1. There exists a partition of Sn to two sets
S ′n and S ′′n = Sn \ S ′n, such that for a sufficiently large n
Ji < δ, for all i ∈ S′n (68)
Ji > 1− δ, for all i ∈ S′′n. (69)
Remark 7 (On degenerated and non-degenerated possible partitions). One of the possible option resulting
from Conjecture 1 is that S ′n = Sn. In case where this degenerated partition is proved to be correct, then it follows
that the additional information provided by the bits in WDcn do not alter the known polarization of the mutual
information quantities Ii in (66). The non-degenerated partition of Sn offers (in the case it is proven to be correct) a
dichotomy of the indices in Sn. Accordingly, either the former polarization remains or alternatively the knowledge
of the bits in WDcn completely changes the orientation of the polarization. The size of S ′′n ∪ A′n must satisfy
|S ′′n ∪ A
′
n|
(a)
= |A′n|+ |A
′′
n|
(b)
≤ nC(p). (70)
Equality (a) in (70) is obvious as the sets A′n and Sn are disjoint. Violating the inequality (b) in (70) results in
violating the coding theorem for a DMC as the input bits to the split channels specified by the set S ′′n ∪A′n can be
reliably decoded (This can be shown in a similar fashion as in [2]).
Remark 8 (On a particular trivial case where Conjecture 1 is true). There exists an option where Conjecture1
is trivially proved as a particular application of Theorem 5. Specifically, assume that for every index i ∈ Dn, it
follows that
j < i ∀j ∈ Dcn.
In that case, the degenerated partition in Remark 7 follows as an immediate particular case of Theorem 5.
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B. A polar secrecy scheme
In this section, a polar secrecy scheme is provided assuming that Conjecture 1 is true. The same notation and
definitions of the coset code defined in Section III-A are assumed. The transmitted codeword x is defined in (19).
This definition is based on the index sets An and Nn. The secure information bits are considered as if they are
being transmitted over the split channels whose indices are in An. Over the split channels whose indices are in
Nn, noisy bits are attributed. The polar secrecy scheme is provided in Section III by a proper choice of the sets
An and Nn. The degradation property in Section III assures that the indices which correspond to split channels
which polarize to ‘good channels’ for the eavesdropper, also polarize for ‘good channels’ for the legitimate user.
This clearly does not necessarily follow for the general not-degraded case.
For the general wiretap channel, indices that are ‘good’ for the eavesdropper may not be ‘good’ for the legitimate
user and vice-versa. A binary-input symmetric wiretap channel is assumed. As in the construction detailed in Part I
of the proof of Theorem 4, the sets A˜n and N˜n of ‘good indices’ are considered. The sets A˜n and N˜n include
the indices for which the Bhattacharyya parameters of the corresponding split channels approach zero as the block
length approach infinity. Specifically, fixing r < C(PY |X) and r∗ < C(PZ|X), the conditions in (39)-(42) follow.
Define the index set Sn , A˜n\N˜n of indices which are ‘good’ for both the legitimate user and the eavesdropper.
According to Conjecture 1, the set Sn can be partitioned into two index sets S ′n and S ′′n , satisfying the polarization
properties in (68)-(69) where An is replaced by N˜n, and A′n is replaced by A˜n ∩ N˜n. Next, the set Nn is defined
according to
Nn ,
(
A˜n ∩ N˜n
)
∪ S ′′n (71)
and the set An is defined to be the remaining indices in Sn, that is
An , S
′
n.
As explained in Remark 7, the term 1
n
|Nn| can not exceed the capacity of the eavesdropper marginal channel.
Consequently, the size of S ′n can be chosen such that 1n |S
′
n| is arbitrarily close to C(PY |X)− C(PZ|X).
Next, the same coset coding scheme defined in (19) is applied to the case at hand (with the new construction of
the sets An and Nn). As the information rate 1n |An| of the considered scheme may be chosen arbitrarily close to
C(PY |X)−C(PZ|X), the same coding rate as in Theorem 4 is obtained. The decoding reliability at the legitimate
user is clear and follows the same proof as for the degraded case (note that all the noisy bits in the considered
scheme are ‘transmitted’ over the split channels that are ‘good’ for the legitimate user). It is left to establish that
the equivocation rate can approach the information rate of the considered scheme.
C. Analysis of the equivocation rate
As explained in Section III-A, the bits bn corresponding to the indices in Bn are predetermined and fixed. These
bits are known both to the eavesdropper and the legitimate user. For each blocklength n, consider the ensemble of
coset codes corresponding for all the possible selection of fixed bits bn. An analysis of the equivocation rate where
the coset code is chosen in random is considered. Specifically, it is assumed that the actual code is chosen from the
ensemble by picking the bits in bn in random. The random selection of the bits in bn is carried independently and
identically. Each bit is picked at random with an equiprobable probability, Pr(0) = Pr(1) = 12 . In addition, it is
assumed that the random selection of bn is independent with the random noisy bits in b∗n and the secret message.
It is important to distinguish between the ransom selection of a code and the noisy bits b∗. The random selection of
code is part of our analysis, this selection (i.e., the bits in bn) is known to both the legitimate and the eavesdropper.
In contrast, the random noisy bits b∗ are immanent part of the encoding procedure and they are unknown to both
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the legitimate user and the receiver. The noisy bits b∗ are picked randomly, each independent with the others, and
with a uniform probability. The information bits are also assumed to be independent and equiprobable.
The secrecy properties of the suggested scheme is considered in the following proposition:
Proposition 6. Consider the polar secrecy scheme in Section IV-B whose transmissions take place over a binary-
input memoryless symmetric wiretap channel. Then, there exists a bit vector bn for which the equivocation rate
satisfy the secrecy condition in (38).
Proof: Denote by W the random binary vector comprises the random bits in bn, b∗n, and u in the encoding
procedure (19), and by Z the random vector received at the eavesdropper. According to the considered assumptions,
all the bits in W are independent and equiprobable. It follows using the chain rule of mutual information that
I(WNn ,WAn ;WBn ,Z) = I(WAn ;WBn ,Z) + I(WNn ;WBn ,Z | WAn)
= I(WAn ;WBn) + I(WAn ;Z | WBn)
+ I(WNn ;WBn | WAn) + I(WNn ;Z | WAn ,WBn)
= H(WAn)−H(WAn | Z,WBn) + I(WNn ;Z | WAn ,WBn) (72)
where the last equality follows since WAn , WNn , and WBn are independent. As the set Nn comprises indices
of split channels which polarize to perfect channels, the bits in WNn can be reliably decoded at the eavesdropper
based on perfect knowledge of the remaining bits and the received vector (this is shown in a similar fashion to [2]).
Hence, the decoding error probability Pe(WN cn) of the bits in WNn based on the received vector and the remaining
bits WN cn , can be made arbitrarily low. As a consequence of Fano’s inequality it follows that
|Nn| ≥ I(WNn ;Z | WAn ,WBn)
= H(WNn| WAn ,WBn)−H(WNn | Z,WAn ,WBn)
> H(WNn)− h2
(
Pe(WN cn)
)
− |Nn|Pe(WN cn) (73)
where h2 is the binary entropy function. For a sufficiently large block length n, the expected decoding error
probability approaches zero. Consequently, 1
n
I(WNn ;Z | WAn ,WBn) can be made arbitrarily close to 1n |Nn|. It
follows from (72) and (73) that
1
n
H(WAn | Z,WBn) ≥
|An|
n
+
|Nn|
n
− ǫn −
1
n
I(WNn ,WAn ;WBn ,Z) (74)
where ǫn ≥ 0 and approaches zero as n grows.
Based on Conjecture 1, the mutual information 1
n
I(WNn ,WAn ;WBn ,Z) can be shown to be arbitrarily close
to 1
n
|Nn|. Using the chain rule of mutual information it follows that
I(WNn ,WAn ;WBn ,Z) =
∑
i∈Nn
I(Wi;WBn ,Z | WN (i)n ,WA(i)n )
+
∑
i∈An
I(Wi;WBn ,Z | WN (i)n ,WA(i)n ).
=
∑
i∈Nn
I(Wi;WN (i)n ,WA(i)n ,WBn ,Z)
+
∑
i∈An
I(Wi;WN (i)n ,WA(i)n ,WBn ,Z). (75)
where the last equality follows as all the bits in W are independent. For every index i ∈ Nn, it follows from
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Lemma 2 and Conjecture 1 that
I(Wi;WN (i)n ,WA(i)n ,WBn ,Z) > 1− δ. (76)
In addition, for all the indices i ∈ An it also follows from Conjecture 1 that
I(Wi;WN (i)n ,WA(i)n ,WBn ,Z) < δ. (77)
From (75), (76) and (77) it follows that
1
n
I(WNn ,WAn ;WBn ,Z) ≤
|Nn|
n
+
δ|An|
n
≤
|Nn|
n
+ δ. (78)
Hence, based on (74) and (78) we end up with
1
n
H(WAn | Z,WBn) ≥
1
n
|An| − ǫn − δ.
As δ can be fixed arbitrarily small, and ǫn approaches zero, the equivocation rate can be made arbitrarily close to
1
n
|An| which assures the secrecy property of the provided scheme.
V. SUMMERY AND CONCLUSIONS
A polar secrecy scheme is provided in this paper for the two-user, memoryless, symmetric and degraded wire-
tap channel. The provided polar codes are shown to achieve the entire rate-equivocation region. Our polar coding
scheme is based on the channel polarization method originally introduced by Arikan [2] for single-user setting. For
the particular case of binary erasure channel, the secrecy capacity is shown to achieve the secrecy capacity under
the strong notion of secrecy.
Proving (disproving, or finding a counter example) Conjecture 1 is the main interest in the continuation of the
research discussed in this paper. The following generalizations are of additional possible interest:
1) Non-binary settings: In light of the recent results by Sasoglu et al. [7], a generalization to the non-binary
setting may be a straight forward generalization.
2) Secrecy polar schemes for non-symmetric wiretap channels, based on the non-binary polarization provided
in [7].
3) Polar coding for a broadcast channel with confidential messages. The particular case of degraded message
sets over a degraded channel is first considered.
4) Strong secrecy properties: As noted, the provided scheme is shown to provide weak secrecy. It is of great
interest to find out if this scheme can also provide strong secrecy.
5) Generalized polar secrecy-schemes based on the ideas in [4], [8]-[10].
6) Combing the polar scheme with the MAC approach for the wiretap channel (see, e.g., [11]).
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